I. INTRODUCTION
In the age of global trade through online commercial transactions, privacy is
becoming a major issue in relation to the dissemination and protection of personal data.
In the context of trade relations between the United States and the European Union
(“EU”), online privacy issues are emerging in light of the widespread differences in
privacy regulation between the two entities. These differences involve compliance with
privacy standards relating to the protection of personal data.
Privacy regimes among various nations exist in either a comprehensive or sectoral
fashion. Under Directive 95/46 EC (“Directive”), the EU employs a comprehensive
approach that binds all EU member states to implement “adequate” protections of
personal data used in commercial transactions.1 In contrast, the U.S. employs a sectoral
approach that involves less privacy protections.2 U.S. companies engaging in online
commerce with the EU are thus facing increasingly rigorous compliance standards. If
such EU standards are not met by a U.S. company, penalties in the form of legal
enforcement actions may result.
With regard to online commercial transactions, the EU utilizes strict privacy
standards for non-EU entities accessing personal data from EU member states. The
reason for introducing such standards is to curb misuse of personal data belonging to EU
parties. Having extensive trade links with a dynamic and increasingly wired EU market,
the U.S. is expressing concern over potential disruptions in trade that would impact
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significantly on U.S commerce. This is because U.S. companies must comply with more
rigorous privacy standards as set in the Directive. In allaying these fears, the U.S. and the
EU conducted negotiations, resulting in the Safe Harbor agreement (“Safe Harbor”).3
Using the Directive’s principles, the Safe Harbor creates a scheme by which U.S.
companies comply with stricter privacy standards relating to the transfer of online
personal data. With respect to U.S. privacy law, this Safe Harbor regime substitutes the
predominant sectoral approach for a more comprehensive approach. Comprehensiveness
within the U.S. privacy regime is gathering momentum partly due to the influences of
both the Directive and Safe Harbor. As part of this comprehensive regime, U.S. federal
agencies act as enforcement authorities in monitoring those U.S. companies collecting
personal data from consumers.
This paper argues that five factors create momentum in gradually shifting U.S.
privacy laws towards a comprehensive regime: (a) the influence of the Directive; (b) the
influence of the Safe Harbor; (c) increasing recognition by Congress that American
consumers need more privacy protections; (d) increased privacy protections by States;
and (e) concerns over potential disruptions in U.S-EU trade relations. Much of this paper
will describe how the Safe Harbor draws from the Directive’s principles in fostering
comprehensiveness among companies involved in the program.

II. COMPREHENSIVE VS. SECTORAL APPROACHES

Privacy approaches between the U.S. and the EU differ substantially. Using the
Directive, the EU approach involves comprehensive privacy protections for consumers
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and businesses transferring personal data.4 Comprehensive protections refer to a broad
scheme of enforcing strict privacy standards (“adequate protection”) that combines all
aspects of privacy law found in various industries under one overarching regime.5 Within
the EU, this regime requires all member states to follow general principles of privacy
protection (espoused under the Directive) by adopting similar forms of legislation to aid
enforcement. The implementation of comprehensive protections involves cooperation
between EU authorities and private industry in order to maintain consistent privacy
standards. An essential feature of comprehensive protections includes rights of redress for
parties whose personal data are mishandled by companies not complying with such
consistent standards. Thus, comprehensive protections obligate all member states to
implement specific rules for entities transferring any personal data.6
An example of a Directive’s specific rule meeting the “adequate” protection
standard is when a party must disclose its own identity and information practices to
individuals interested in presenting personal data.7 Personal data generally include an
individual’s name, home and e-mail address, telephone and social security number, and
credit card number.8 Individual enforcement authorities known as Data Protection
Authorities (“DPAs”) oversee this standard throughout the EU.9 The DPAs are
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authorized entities meant to ensure that the Directive’s privacy standards are met within
each EU member state, while also investigating and resolving privacy disputes.10
Under Article 28(1), the Directive delegates broad powers to the DPAs in
completely restricting personal data flow between an EU entity and a U.S. entity when a
privacy violation is committed.11 Furthermore, if a U.S. company does not comply with
advice given by a DPA to conform to “adequate” protections of personal data, the DPA
will notify the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) or other U.S. federal or state bodies
with statutory powers to take enforcement actions.12 The Directive also bestows
substantial authority upon the DPAs to enforce privacy standards that are even more
rigorous than the Directive itself.13
In contrast to the comprehensive approach, the U.S. follows a sectoral approach.
The sectoral approach refers to a privacy scheme whereby federal and state governments
regulate standards within specified sectors of the economy.14 The U.S. privacy regime is
sectoral in nature because privacy regulation involves a mix of federal/state legislation
and self-regulation.15 Whereas federal and state statutes govern the extent of personal
data transfer under specific circumstances, self-regulation generally refers to U.S.
companies enforcing their own privacy standards with little government involvement, but
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providing for some means of consumer redress.16 A drawback with the sectoral approach
is that it is difficult to enforce uniform privacy standards knowing that other industries
not within the purview of government regulation have different standards. This makes it
difficult to establishbaseline privacy standard s from which consumers and businesses
alike can follow. But, with the growing influence of the Directive in terms of personal
data transfer between EU and U.S. entities, this sectoral regime is gradually being
replaced by self-regulation under a more elaborate scheme of monitoring personal data
compliance.
Traditionally, privacy statutes were introduced by Congress to establish controls
over the handling of consumer personal data by governmental sources rather than private
entities. In recent times, however, Congress recognizes that American consumers are
concerned about personal data protection from private sources. That is, American
consumers feel that this sectoral approach does little to protect online personal data.17 In
gaining a sense of this concern, a project known as the Georgetown Internet Privacy
Policy Survey revealed that 92.8% of U.S. commercial websites (randomly selected out
of 361 websites) contained some type of personal identifying information, such as e-mail
and postal address.18
(A) THE U.S. APPROACH PRIOR TO THE DIRECTIVE: COPPA AND THE FTC

Ensuring that privacy compliance exists requires legitimate enforcement from
recognized authorities. Before the Directive, privacy enforcement in the U.S. was carried
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through the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”).19 Introduced by
Congress in 1998, COPPA affords personal data protections similar to that of the
Directive, but specifically for children using the Internet.20 COPPA requires company
websites receiving personal data from children under the age of 13 to post a privacy
policy detailing the personal data they collect from young visitors.21 Here, the protected
information relates to user registration, or personal data that children reveal in chat rooms
or posting services.22 The website must also have a parental notification-and-approval
policy in place.23

Enforcement of COPPA regulations was successfully administered by the FTC in
fining San Francisco-based LookSmart Ltd. for $35,000 in redirecting visitors to a
different site owned by the company.24 The FTC argued that LookSmart Ltd. illegally
collected personal data from children without getting permission from their parents.25
Furthermore, the FTC noted that the LookSmart Ltd. website posted no privacy policy as
required by COPPA.26 COPPA thus illustrates how the FTC plays an active role in
enforcing broader privacy protections within a U.S sectoral regime prior to the Directive.
By fining U.S. companies for misusing personal data of American consumers, the FTC
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demonstrates its commitment in targeting U.S. companies for privacy violations relating
to online commercial transactions.

(B) THE EU DATA PRIVACY DIRECTIVE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON U.S. BUSINESSES

Since the 1970s, EU member states are utilizing comprehensive privacy standards
to safeguard European consumers and businesses.27 Because EU member states initially
followed a sectoral approach for personal data protection, the EU introduced stronger
measures in the Directive to establish an over-arching privacy regime.28 Initially
proposed by the EU in 1995 and later adopted in 1998, the Directive provides a
harmonized set of privacy standards within all industries that ensure the free flow of
personal data between EU member states.29
Through Article 25, the Directive also creates specific guidelines in regulating
the export of personal data from EU states to “third countries” only when such countries
meet “adequate” protection standards.30 Adequate privacy refers to compliance with
strict standards set forth by the Directive whereby non-EU entities are required to provide
personal data protections to EU entities supplying such data.31 This compliance
mechanism is influencing a change among U.S. businesses with regard to the handling of
personal data. Realizing that EU privacy violations are enforced under the watchful eye
of DPAs, U.S. companies hope to avoid a disruption in online personal data transfers
during relevant transactions. In this regard, the Directive is compelling U.S businesses to
27
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embrace EU-like privacy standards, and thereby modify their own personal data
collection practices. As one commentator notes:
The impact of the EU Directive demonstrates that the actions of other
powerful states also shape U.S. regulation and business practice. Although
the scope and content of U.S. regulation of data privacy protection depend
substantially on domestic factors, EU regulatory policy significantly
affects the playing field in the United States … External pressures from
the European Union enhance the impact of U.S. internal pressures. The
EU Directive prods U.S. businesses to change their behavior to avoid
confrontations with EU regulators. It prompts U.S. legislators to press
U.S. businesses to enhance their internal standards to avoid a regulatory
conflict.32

The influence of the Directive upon U.S. privacy law is apparent in that a
comprehensive regime with strict standards is finding its way into a sectoral regime. As
one commentator states: “The European Directive exerts significant pressure on U.S.
information rights, practices, and policies. The Directive facilitates a single information
market place within Europe through a harmonized set of rules, but also forces scrutiny of
U.S. data privacy.”33 With billions of dollars being exchanged in online transactions
between companies in the EU and the U.S., it follows that non-compliance would prevent
the flow of streamlined transactions. Another commentator illustrates the Directive’s
influence on U.S. privacy law in terms of impacting trade relations: “Brussels has gone so
far as to give an ultimatum to Washington: adopt strong privacy laws, or stand the risk of
losing countless trillions of dollars of business with Europe.”34
Since U.S. businesses are accustomed to sectoral privacy laws with little oversight
from a central enforcement authority, the challenge is to rearrange their methods of
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collecting personal data by guaranteeing “adequate” protection for EU entities.
Conforming to such standards serves the dual purpose of helping U.S. companies avoid
facing EU legal enforcement action, while preserving existing business contacts within
the EU. To meet these challenges, it would be essential to find an appropriate
compromise to resolve the U.S.- EU privacy regime differences.

III. ENTER THE SAFE HARBOR: ACTING AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR
COMPREHENSIVENESS IN THE U.S.

With different privacy regimes in place, the U.S. struck a political compromise
with the EU to ease concerns expressed by both entities over potential disruptions in trade
relations. This compromise known as the Safe Harbor is gradually incorporating
comprehensive privacy standards (derived from the Directive) into a U.S sectoral-based
system. The Directive influences the Safe Harbor by furnishing broad standards of
“adequate” protections. Because of its nature as a voluntary agreement and not as official
law, the Safe Harbor does not bind all U.S. states to embrace comprehensive privacy
standards. However, on the corporate level the Safe Harbor replaces the sectoral approach
with a comprehensive approach by requiring company compliance with specific
principles of “adequate” protections of personal data. In this way, the Safe Harbor acts as
an important precursor to the development of comprehensive laws within the U.S. private
sector by emphasizing compliance with stricter privacy standards.
This Safe Harbor agreement was successfully negotiated between the Department
of Commerce (“DOC”) and the European Commission in July 2000.35 A statement made
by Robert LaRussa, the Acting Under Secretary of the International Trade
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Administration, amply illustrates the overall purpose of the Safe Harbor: “The safe
harbor is a landmark accord for e-commerce. It bridges the differences between EU and
U.S. approaches to privacy protection and will ensure that data flows between the U.S.
and the EU are not interrupted. As a result, it should help ensure that e-commerce
continues to flourish.”36
The Safe Harbor is thus a means for streamlining commercial activity using
online personal data protections as a means for U.S. businesses to satisfy EU-like
“adequacy” requirements. The link between the Directive and the Safe Harbor is that U.S.
companies voluntarily joining the Safe Harbor are required to follow seven principles
(“Principles”) when transferring personal data with EU entities: (1) Notice; (2) Choice;
(3) Onward Transfer; (4) Security; (5) Data Integrity; (6) Access; and (7) Enforcement.37
Notice has three functions: (a) it informs the individual as to the purpose for which the
data is being used; (b) it provides a means to contact companies for inquiries or
complaints; and (c) it gives information on the types of third parties who have access to
the personal data held by the online provider.38
Choice offers individuals the chance to: (a) ‘opt out’ if personal data is disclosed
to a third party, or used for a purpose other than which it is originally intended; and (b)
‘opt-in’ for sensitive personal data (i.e. health, ethnic origin) which is disclosed to third
parties.39 Onward Transfer allows the transfer of personal data to third parties acting as
an agent for the company collecting the data, provided that the company ensures that the
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agent complies with the Principles or is subject to the Directive.40 Security requires
companies to take reasonable precautions to protect personal data from loss, misuse,
unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration, or destruction.41
Data integrity requires that personal data be relevant for the purpose for which it
is to be used.42 Access allows individuals to review company records to correct, amend,
or delete personal data that is inaccurate or too sensitive in nature.43 Finally, enforcement
demands that companies provide recourse mechanisms for individuals to resolve privacy
disputes, and award damages.44 These seven Principles represent a baseline standard from
which U.S. companies collecting personal data from EU entities must follow to meet the
“adequate” protection standard. Any U.S. company receiving personal data from an EU
party without abiding by these Principles may face legal enforcement action either by a
U.S. or EU authority, which may result in a court awarding damages to the EU party.45
More importantly, however, personal data collected by U.S. companies during a
commercial transaction will be terminated by U.S. or EU enforcement authorities.46

(A) DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVENESS: STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE
SAFE HARBOR

The structural arrangement of the Safe Harbor allows U.S. federal agencies to
formally embody comprehensive standards similar to that of EU authorities. At the onset
of joining the Safe Harbor, U.S. companies may choose between FTC or DPA
40
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enforcement for resolving privacy disputes. This manner of choosing bolsters the FTC’s
ability to enforce “adequate” protection standards within the U.S. The FTC takes on a
role similar to that of the DPA by ensuring that companies handling personal data during
commercial transactions meet the “adequate” protection standard.
By providing a choice between using either FTC or DPA enforcement
mechanisms, the Safe Harbor invites U.S. companies to provide their own enforcement
mechanisms (normally used in a sectoral approach) in order to meet the “adequate”
standard. Although such an arrangement merges a sectoral-based principle with an EU
requirement, the Safe Harbor still manages to incorporate some elements of a
comprehensive scheme into a sectoral regime. Over time, U.S. companies familiarize
themselves with such stricter privacy standards.

(B) DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVENESS WITHIN U.S. COMPANIES: SELFREGULATION AND SELF-CERTIFICATION

Ensuring that “adequate” privacy protections are enforced within the Safe Harbor,
Self-regulation and self-certification are two methods of achieving this goal. When EU
parties complain about the content and use of personal data, U.S. companies utilize
specific procedures in a process known as self-regulation.47 Self-regulation allows U.S.
companies to create an independent means for resolving privacy disputes with EU
parties, such as with dispute resolution.48 If a U.S. company commits a privacy violation,
an EU party is encouraged to settle the dispute within the U.S.49 Thus, self-regulation
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provides a means to enforce “adequate” privacy protections with little governmental
involvement.50
Apart from the Safe Harbor, the most common form of self-regulation in the U.S.
involves online privacy seal programs, such as TRUSTe and BBBOnline.51 The link
between such programs and the Safe Harbor is that the seal programs assist U.S.
companies in creating privacy policy statements that resemble Safe Harbor-like privacy
standards.52 The Safe Harbor uses these forms of self-regulation as part of its scheme to
merge the traditionally U.S. sectoral approach within a more comprehensive EU-like
regime. The incorporation of this procedure denotes flexibility in enforcement.
However, a major criticism regarding online privacy seal programs relates to
implementation.53 Pursuant to the Online Privacy and Disclosure Act of 2000, such
programs normally display a distinct privacy seal on a U.S. company’s website to prove
that it is complying with the Principles.54 The seal programs alert the EU consumer as to
the information practices used by a U.S. company during an online commercial
transaction. But the problem with seal programs, as indicated in a 2000 FTC Report to
Congress, is that “[t]he seal programs have yet to establish a significant presence on the
Web.”55
Recently, however, more seal programs are being found on U.S. commercial
websites. For instance, a seal program on the FTC’s website shows a “Dewie e-Turtle”

50

Blanke, supra note 7, at 69.
Federal Trade Commission Report. Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic
Marketplace A Report to Congress 6 (May 2000) [hereinafter FTC Report].
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 3.
55
Id. at 6.
51

13

privacy seal.56 The “Dewie” initiative encourages U.S. consumers and businesses to
review FTC recommendations to safeguard personal data.57 The FTC website also
contains links to other privacy protection sites such as the National Cyber Security
Alliance’s StaySafeOnline.info.58 The growth of website seal programs demonstrates the
level of commitment by U.S. entities (like the FTC) to promote personal data protection
schemes among American consumers and businesses.
The other means of joining the Safe Harbor is self-certification.59 Under selfcertification, a U.S. company sends a letter to the DOC stating its intent to voluntarily
join the Safe Harbor, while also agreeing to cooperate with the DPAs in the event an
investigation of privacy disputes is brought by EU parties.60 This is an annual
certification process assuring the DOC that a U.S. company will adhere to Safe Harbor
privacy standards for personal data collection.61
By publicly declaring its intent to join the Safe Harbor, a U.S. company also
agrees to post a detailed privacy policy statement on its website that purports to comply
with “adequate” standards.62 Nevertheless, U.S. companies are concerned about facing
legal actions over privacy violations that they unknowingly commit under the Safe
Harbor. Upon joining the Safe Harbor, U.S. companies may use either FTC or EU
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enforcement bodies to resolve privacy disputes in case their own dispute resolution
mechanisms do not suffice.63
Regardless of whether or not self-regulation or self-certification resolves a
privacy dispute, these procedures involve significant contact with both U.S. and EU
authorities. This system of administration ensures the implementation of more
comprehensive privacy protection standards within the U.S by holding U.S. companies
accountable for their actions. That is, when U.S. companies voluntarily join the Safe
Harbor but commit privacy violations, little can be done to escape liability knowing that
U.S. federal agencies and EU authorities are directly involved in overseeing compliance.
In this sense, the Safe Harbor mimics the style of EU compliance for “adequate”
protection.

(C) DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVENESS: SAFE HARBOR REQUIREMENTS

Complying with the Safe Harbor’s general requirements signals a U.S company’s
intent to meet EU adequacy requirements relating to personal data protections. If a U.S.
company voluntarily joins the Safe Harbor, it must follow five general guidelines.64 First,
the company must comply with all seven Principles.65 Second, it must review the fifteen
frequently asked questions (“FAQs”) prepared by the DOC.66 Third, it must certify to the
DOC that it has implemented the Principles, either publicly in the form of “self-
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certification” or through “self-regulation”.67 Fourth, it must have available appropriate
enforcement mechanisms, along with an independent third-party dispute resolution
mechanism for privacy violations.68 Fifth, it must continue complying with the Principles
in good faith while participating throughout the Safe Harbor program.69
These requirements illustrate the commitment involved in joining a
comprehensive regime like the Safe Harbor. Modifying data collection practices to
conform to the Principles requires an understanding and acceptance of more
comprehensive privacy laws designed to permit a highly regulated form of online
commercial transactions. Cooperation with the DOC for reviewing FAQs and the
notification requirement encourages a U.S. company to form a unique partnership with
federal authorities. This partnership bears a striking resemblance to an EU entities’ close
dealings with a DPA. Since the sectoral approach has no such partnership, it follows that
the Safe Harbor seems to foster a comprehensive-like approach by promoting cooperation
between government and private industry in the scope of Safe Harbor privacy
compliance.

(D) DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVENESS: PRIVACY WEST AND DIRECT
MARKETING ASSOCIATION

The Safe Harbor’s influence in promoting comprehensiveness not only extends to
Safe Harbor companies but also to the U.S. private industry, thereby encouraging U.S.
companies to join the Safe Harbor. Companies are establishing various websites as a
means to ensure compliance with EU adequacy standards. For example, Privacy West is a
67
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California business specializing in helping small to medium size businesses with Safe
Harbor privacy compliance.70 Realizing that companies are concerned over the costs
associated with meeting Safe Harbor requirements, Privacy West creates practical
methods for U.S. companies to establish privacy policies that conform to the Principles.
Such methods include step-by-step instructions on how U.S. companies can self-regulate
instead of self-certifying with the DOC.71
Other U.S. companies are actively promoting “adequacy” standards via the Safe
Harbor. For instance, the Direct Marketing Association (“DMA”), the largest trade
association for U.S. businesses involved in global marketing, operates a DMA Safe
Harbor Program (“DMASHP”).72 DMA members include, among others, AT&T, IBM,
the New York Times, and Proctor & Gamble.73 This program helps DMA members
create privacy policies on websites that conform to all Safe Harbor Principles.74
This program also helps U.S. companies by providing independent third-party
dispute resolution mechanisms.75 This type of assistance fulfills one of the five Safe
Harbor general guidelines requiring companies to seek third-party dispute resolution
mechanisms when privacy complaints are lodged against them by EU entities. The
DMA’s dispute resolution body satisfies EU entities by providing: (1) fair and unbiased
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decision-making; (2) an accessible means of filing a complaint; (3) resolution of a dispute
in a timely manner; and (4) certainty in enforcing legal actions.76
The DMA also has a “Safe Harbor Line”, which is a free consumer service
offering advice on matters relating to privacy disputes between EU entities and U.S.
companies.77 In this way, U.S. companies educate the general public about unfamiliar
privacy standards. If there is no resolution on a matter, the Safe Harbor Line staff directs
EU consumer complaints to the DMA’s Safe Harbor Program Committee for review.78
This committee is composed of direct marketing experts and recognized consumer
representatives.79
If this DMA body finds that a U.S. company clearly violates a Safe Harbor
Principle, it may notify such a violation to the FTC and DOC, who then take appropriate
legal action.80 Moreover, sanctions are imposed on such U.S. companies by: (1)
correcting or deleting inaccurate personal information; (2) reimbursing direct monetary
damages to consumers; (3) suspending the company from the DMA Safe Harbor
Program; and (4) generating publicity for non-compliance.81 Once again, a unique
mechanism of cooperation exists between a U.S. company and a federal agency (much
like the EU privacy regime) in regulating strict privacy standards. The DMA program
illustrates how one U.S. company supplements “adequate” privacy compliance in other
U.S. companies.
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The legal authority in the DMA Safe Harbor Program Committee derives from
specific provisions in a contract.82 For example, the DMA Safe Harbor Program
Contract under section 9 notes:
Participant’s failure to comply with any and all remedies resulting from
the DMASHP may, pursuant to the Safe Harbor, result in The DMA’s
notifying any known governmental entity or other self-regulation program
in any country, including without limitation the Attorney General of any
State, the United States Federal Trade Commission, any law enforcement
agency, any other state or federal governmental agency with jurisdiction
over this matter, or any foreign privacy authority or other foreign
government authority, of Participant’s non-compliance.83
The DMA program thus illustrates how legally binding obligations are imposed
by the Safe Harbor on U.S. businesses. The language of the DMA contract suggests that
not only will a U.S. company be disciplined by various U.S. federal authorities, but also
by governments and foreign privacy authorities “in any country”. The contract also
indicates a close partnership that exists between the U.S. federal government, private
industry, and foreign governments in promoting “adequate” privacy compliance. By
providing assistance to U.S. companies not familiar with comprehensive privacy
protections for personal data, the DMA program acts as a conduit for U.S. companies
willing to conduct online commercial transactions with EU entities, while limiting the
risk of committing privacy violations.

IV. INCENTIVE FOR U.S. COMPANIES TO JOIN THE SAFE HARBOR: TRADE RELATIONS

To gain a sense of the economic impact that privacy compliance has upon trade
relations, trade in personal data between the U.S. and the EU in 2000 was valued at $120
82
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billion.84 The Safe Harbor’s impact upon commercial activities within the U.S. acts as a
warning for U.S. companies who resist changing current personal data collection
practices when dealing with EU entities. Although U.S. companies are taking an
understandably cautious approach in deciding whether or not to join the Safe Harbor,
other companies such as IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and Microsoft are active participants in
the program, giving them considerable leverage in an enlarging EU market.85 It follows
that in order to remain competitive in the EU market, U.S. companies must change their
own data collection practices to comply with more comprehensive privacy standards.
Not making these changes will affect their ability to transfer personal data necessary for
commercial transactions.
Having U.S. companies comply with the Safe Harbor restores confidence in EU
entities that suggests the U.S. is making a concerted effort to improve and actively
enforce more comprehensive privacy standards. Joining the Safe Harbor also creates a
presumption that U.S. companies provide “adequate” protection, as espoused under
Article 25 of the Directive.86 With the EU market representing almost 500 million
citizens, U.S. companies are eager to maintain, if not increase, trade relations with the EU
by actively promoting comprehensive privacy compliance. Aside from trade relations, the
U.S. is also recognizing how personal data is becoming a sensitive issue among
American consumers - one that impacts local online commerce. Congress reiterates this
point by noting that: “Market research demonstrates that tens of billions of dollars in e84
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commerce are lost due to individual fears about a lack of privacy protection on the
Internet.”87

V. THE SAFE HARBOR AS A SUBSTITUTE AND PRECURSOR FOR COMPREHENSIVENESS
IN THE U.S.

Congress recognizes the need to introduce an overarching privacy regime. Even
prior to the Safe Harbor, U.S. legislators felt that more concrete privacy laws should be
enacted for the benefit of American consumers. Congress summarizes this sentiment in
the Electronic Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 1999 by noting that: “A national privacy
policy that relies in part upon industry self-regulatory initiatives, technological tools for
consumers, and Government-backed protections is needed to foster future development
of electronic commerce and to safeguard the essential rights of individuals with respect to
collection and use of their personal data.”88
Although the Safe Harbor is an attempt to resolve privacy regime differences
between the U.S. and the EU, it establishes a baseline from which Congress can adopt
more comprehensive privacy laws. This can be achieved by using the Principles as a
common standard for individual states to safeguard personal data of consumers. Although
privacy enforcement in the U.S is administered primarily through self-regulation in the
private sector, a noticeable partnership is developing between the U.S. government and
U.S. private entities to improve privacy compliance. As the DOC notes: “Private sector
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self regulation and enforcement will be backed up as needed by government enforcement
of the federal and state unfair and deceptive statutes.”89
That is, if EU entities are dissatisfied with U.S. private sector enforcement for
privacy violations, the U.S. government remains committed to carry through on the
enforcement process. Considering that various U.S. state legislatures are adopting privacy
laws in accordance with Safe Harbor-like standards, it appears that U.S. privacy law is
being shaped in accordance with privacy standards in the Directive. Introducing
comprehensive privacy measures illustrates the effort to administer greater privacy
protections for U.S. entities, while ensuring streamlined commerce with EU entities. In
the context of online commercial activity, the generous protections afforded by the Safe
Harbor to EU entities beyond its jurisdiction influences the U.S. approach to adopt
similar protections for American entities.

(A) DRAWING FROM THE DIRECTIVE: OPPA

Remedies function as a means to encourage U.S. companies to comply with strict
privacy controls for personal data collection. The Safe Harbor prompted the U.S. to
introduce legislation to provide compensation for U.S. citizens affected by privacy
violations. The Online Personal Privacy Act of 2002 (“OPPA”) grants remedies to
American consumers who provide personal data to U.S. companies that fall short of
providing “adequate” privacy protection.90
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The OPPA distinguishes between sensitive and non-sensitive information.91 For
sensitive information (such as financial data, health records, ethnicity, or sexual
orientation), the OPPA grants a private right of action in a U.S. district court if an internet
service provider or commercial website operator inappropriately discloses such
information.92 Upon a showing of actual harm, an individual may recover monetary
losses or $5000.93 For repeated privacy violations of sensitive information, OPPA gives
wide discretion to courts for increasing the amount of damages, but not in excess of
$100,000.94
A comparison between the Directive and OPPA reveals how online providers are
required to follow notice and consent requirements when handling personal data of users.
For instance, Article 7 of the Directive states: “Member States shall provide that personal
data may be processed only if: (a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent .
. . .”95 Under Section 102(b) of OPPA, “An internet service provider, online service
provider, or operator of a commercial website may not – (1) collect sensitive personally
identifiable information online, or (2) disclose . . . such information collected online,
from a user of that service or website, unless the provider or operator obtains that user’s
consent . . .”96
OPPA thus demonstrates how Congress draws from the Directive to ensure
“adequate” protection of personal data for U.S. citizens. As one speaker indicates in an
OPPA Senate floor statement: “In this respect, the legislation is also similar to the two-
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tiered approach taken by the European Union in which companies are required to provide
baseline protections governing the use of non-sensitive information, and stronger consent
protections governing the use of sensitive data.”97 This recognition by U.S. legislators
for providing greater personal data protections for U.S. citizens is another instance that
stronger privacy measures are being incorporated within U.S. privacy law.

(B) DRAWING FROM THE DIRECTIVE: CPPA

Aside from OPPA, other privacy statutes passed by Congress reveal a trend
towards adopting comprehensive privacy standards. For instance, the Consumer Privacy
Protection Act of 2000 (“CPPA”) establishes privacy protections for online personal data
by drawing statutory language from the Directive.98 For instance, a striking similarity
exists between the Directive and the CPPA regarding the Principle of Access. Under
Article 12 of the Directive (Right of Access), “Member States shall guarantee every data
right to obtain from the controller: . . . (b) as appropriate the rectification, erasure or
blocking of data the processing of which does not comply with the provisions of this
Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data.”99
Likewise, under Section 102(c) of the CPPA (Access), “[a]n Internet service
provider, online service provider, or operator of a commercial website shall … (2)
provide a reasonable opportunity for a user to correct, delete, or supplement any such
information maintained by that provider or operator;”100 The similarity between the
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Directive and the CPPA exists in the statutory language such that online service providers
are required to permit consumers to access and modify personal data. Both statutes grant
the consumer considerable power to control the content and transfer of personal data
during online commercial transactions.
The CPPA contributes to comprehensiveness in the U.S. by raising awareness to
both the FTC and Congress about the growing importance of privacy protections
affecting American consumers. For instance, section 307 of the CPPA requires the FTC
to establish an Office of Online Privacy to study privacy issues related to e-commerce and
the Internet.101 This body submits annual reports to the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, as well as the House of Representatives Committee on
Commerce.102 The Office of Online Privacy also recommends additional privacy
legislation to Congress.103 This process ensures that Congress is aware of concerns
addressed by American consumers over privacy protections, while also signaling the need
to promulgate stricter standards within the U.S.
Realizing that the FTC actively enforces comprehensive privacy standards,
Congress is certainly attentive of consumer complaints of online privacy protections. In
the context of the CPPA, Congress notes that: “[p]rivacy safeguards should be applied
uniformly across different communications media so as to provide consistent consumer
privacy protections.”104 In efforts to study online privacy issues affecting Americans,
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Congress established a bi-partisan group known as the Congressional Privacy Caucus in
February 2000 (“Caucus”).105
The Caucus seeks to educate members of Congress on privacy issues such as
consent, unauthorized access to personal data, and basic privacy protections for online
commercial activity.106 The Caucus also holds forums and discussion panels with
privacy advocates and Internet companies to address privacy issues in the hopes of
making important legislative proposals.107 For instance, the issue of web bugs is
eliciting the Caucus to question the use of invisible tracking methods to determine online
transactional behavior.108 To counter what it sees as a blatant misuse of such data, the
Caucus seeks laws that limit the manner in which online companies gather and exchange
personal data.109

(C) CONTRIBUTING TO COMPREHENSIVENESS: THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Extraordinary changes led by the FTC are shaping U.S. privacy laws to
encompass broader privacy standards. In November 1999, a joint effort between the FTC
and DOC resulted in presenting a public workshop on “online profiling” by third-party
advertisers.110 This workshop educates the public about privacy issues, while also

105

Rachel K. Zimmerman, The Way the “Cookies” Crumble: Internet Privacy and Data Protection in the
Twenty-First Century, 4 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Policy 439, 459 (2000-01) (quoting Michele Masterson,
Privacy Fuels Government Efforts: Growing Internet Privacy Concerns Spur Politicians to Introduce New
Legislation (Mar. 9, 2000), available at < http://www.cnnfn.com/2000/03/09/technology/q_legislation/>
(last visited March 30, 2003).
106
Id.
107
Senator Chris Dodd website, Dodd Joins Congressional Privacy Caucus, available at
<http://dodd.senate.gov/press/Releases/01/0201.htm> (as of February 1, 2001) (last visited March 30,
2003).
108
ADLAW, Hall Dickler Kent Goldstein & Wood, Congressional Group to Coordinate Privacy Debate, Seeks to
Prohibit Web Bugs, available at <http://www.adlawbyrequest.com/legislation/WebBugPrivacyCaucus.shtml>
(February 12, 2001) (last visited March 30, 2003).
109
Id.
110
FTC Report, supra note 51, at 5.

26

highlighting fair information practices in the scope of online advertising.111 In December
1999, the FTC assembled an Advisory Committee on Online Access and Security,
consisting of industry representatives, security specialists, and consumer and privacy
advocates.112 Convening in public meetings, this body advises the FTC about fair
information practice principles within the U.S.113
In applying practical enforcement measures, the FTC identifies five core
principles of privacy protection, as derived from the Organization of Economic and
Cooperation of Development (OECD) Guidelines and the Directive.114 These principles
include: (1) Notice/Awarness; (2) Choice/Consent; (3) Access/Participation; (4)
Integrity/Security; and (5) Enforcement/Redress.115 If a U.S. company adheres to these
five principles, the FTC labels such compliance as a “fair information practice”.116 This
form of compliance amounts to the “adequate” protection standard as defined by the
Directive.
During privacy disputes under the Safe Harbor, a decision favoring an EU entity
upon a showing that a U.S. company continually violates the “adequate” protection
standard results in the case being brought under the FTC’s jurisdiction.117 Here, due
process is afforded to the non-compliant U.S. company, but this company is immediately
dropped from the Safe Harbor.118 The consequence of such action is that the company
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puts itself into disrepute with the FTC, DOC, and EU entities. This puts a company at a
disadvantage in terms of collecting personal data securely from EU sources. If an EU
party learns of a company’s failure to meet the “adequate” protection standard because it
is dropped from the Safe Harbor, any correspondence made by this company may be
blocked by an appropriate DPA. Thus, the ability to conduct online commerce with EU
parties affects the business prospects of any non-compliant U.S. company doing business
in the EU.
A similarity exists between the EU and the U.S. in terms of the structural
arrangement of privacy authorities. Under Article 29 of the Directive, an advisory group
known as the “Working Party” oversees the protection of consumers’ personal data with
regard to online commercial activities.119 The Working Party ensures uniform privacy
compliance in each EU member state, and is required by the EU Commission to submit
annual reports regarding the status of personal data protections.120
The analogous U.S. enforcement body for privacy compliance is the FTC. Like
the Working Party, the FTC submits annual reports to legislative bodies on privacy
protection standards.121 Many of the FTC’s findings relate to consumer privacy issues.122
For instance, a 2002 FTC Report reveals that up to $18 billion is lost in online retail due
to data privacy concerns expressed by American consumers.123 Such findings are enough
to compel Congress to introduce legislation that safeguards personal data of American
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consumers. The FTC thus demonstrates how its monitoring of compliance standards
within the U.S. helps prod legislative changes to the existing privacy regime.

(D) CONTRIBUTING TO COMPREHENSIVENESS: THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

The DOC is a key federal agency in helping the FTC regulate online privacy in
the U.S. The DOC’s commitment to ensuring “adequate” privacy protection is amply
illustrated in a formal letter sent to the EU in 1999: “We will encourage U.S.
organizations to enter the safe harbor as soon as possible to enhance privacy protection
and because participation in the safe harbor provides greater certainty that data flows will
continue without interruption.”124 Fifteen frequently asked questions (FAQs) are
available on the DOC Safe Harbor website for companies interested in learning about all
aspects of the Safe Harbor.125
The Safe Harbor website also includes a Safe Harbor Workbook, documents,
public comments, and a Compliance Checklist for EU entities to review.126 Like the FTC
website for the “Dewie” initiative, the Safe Harbor website contains a link geared
specifically for privacy statements.127 The DOC also maintains a Safe Harbor list
(“List”), which displays only those U.S. companies voluntarily participating in the Safe
Harbor.128 The List helps EU entities involved in online transactions with U.S.
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companies to ascertain whether U.S. companies are complying with “adequate” privacy
protections.
Both the FTC and DOC illustrate the commitment made by U.S. federal agencies
in implementing the Safe Harbor. Working in a coordinated fashion to monitor
“adequate” privacy protections within a traditionally sectoral regime, these two agencies
are shaping U.S. privacy law to resemble EU comprehensive standards. This has much to
do with the realization that maintaining data transfers between U.S. and EU entities is
essential in preserving strong trade links. But aside from federal agencies changing
existing privacy standards, States are also making great strides in contributing towards a
more comprehensive privacy regime.

(E) CONTRIBUTING TO COMPREHENSIVENESS: MINNESOTA AND VERMONT

Individual states are moving toward comprehensiveness by expanding privacy
protections for personal data provided by state residents during online commercial
transactions. However, this trend is not entirely equivalent to the EU definition of
comprehensiveness. This is because all industries handling personal data within States
still self-regulate without being subject to an overarching regime. Instead, there are
stricter “adequate” standards being introduced. Nonetheless, this trend suggests that
States are moving towards some form of comprehensiveness.
Minnesota’s adoption of the Internet Consumer Privacy Act (“ICPA”) in May
2002 is a state initiative safeguarding the personal data of Minnesota consumers.129
Labeled as Chapter 395, the ICPA is the first law among the States requiring online
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service providers to disclose their own information practices when receiving personal
data from any Minnesota consumer.130 The ICPA also prohibits the use of “false or
misleading” e-mail messages whereby a provider uses a consumer’s domain name
without permission.131 Damages may be awarded in the amount of $25 for each e-mail,
or $35,000 per day for a violation of the “false and misleading” provision.132
Article 1 of the ICPA provides that a Minnesota consumer is entitled to $500 or
actual damages for a violation of Minnesota’s privacy laws.133 The ICPA also requires
the initiator of an e-mail message to have a toll-free phone number or return e-mail
address to give consumers a choice on whether to receive future e-mails.134 This
requirement echoes the FTC Act’s ‘fair information practice’ of providing relevant
contact information.135 The requirement also reflects the Safe Harbor “opt-out” option
under the “Choice” Principle.136
Since March 1, 2003, the ICPA requires any online service provider soliciting
business from Minnesota consumers to request direct authorization from the consumer to
receive personal data.137 Moreover, the online service provider must explicitly mark email messages with “ADV” to give notice to the consumer that the provider intends to
use its personal data with “adequate” privacy standards.138 This requirement parallels the
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online privacy seal programs of TRUSTe and BBBOnline that require privacy seals on
the website as evidence of meeting “adequate” privacy protection standards.
The ICPA is significant in that privacy protections espoused by federal standards
are being reinforced under state law. The ICPA also reflects the growing concern
expressed by American consumers over personal data protections. As the ICPA’s
legislative history suggests, Minnesota enacted privacy protections in response to
concerns addressed by state residents over personal data collection practices of
companies.139 The Minnesota legislation thus demonstrates how a State favors newer and
tougher measures to protect personal data used in online commercial transactions.
Like the Directive and the Safe Harbor’s principle of “Choice”, Vermont’s
privacy law in the health sector emphasizes “opt-in” measures for the consumer.
Specifically, Vermont’s “opt-in” privacy law affords protection of personal health care
data of Vermont residents.140 The “opt-in” law gives Vermont consumers the power to
consent when disclosing personal data to relevant health authorities.141 Moreover,
Vermont consumers are required to “opt-in” when disclosing information to third parties,
such as marketers.142 Any party willfully disclosing personal health care data without the
consumer’s consent will face civil penalties of no greater than $10,000.143
Although Vermont’s “opt-in” law is sectoral with respect to health care data
protections, the law incorporates fundamental principles espoused in the Directive and
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the Safe Harbor. These principles relate to greater transparency on the part of the online
provider. Much like the Directive and the Safe Harbor, § 9471(a)(4) of the Vermont
privacy law requires: “Identification of individuals who are authorized to disclose health
care information.”144 That is, any party receiving sensitive personal data from Vermont
consumers is required to clearly identify itself for accountability purposes.
State legislatures are thus introducing more effective privacy controls over the
content and use of personal data for state residents. Upon a review of the Minnesota and
Vermont initiatives, specific elements of privacy protections found in the Directive and
Safe Harbor are finding its way into state privacy laws. For instance, the Principle of
“Choice” affords greater control over the content of personal data used in online
transactions for consumers in both Minnesota and Vermont. But this trend in providing
consumers with the power to regulate personal data within States is in response to a
national concern expressed by American consumers over personal data protections.
In a wider sense, this trend suggests that individual states are equal to the task in
adopting more comprehensive privacy laws much like the federal government. As states
launch programs designed to increase uniformity in the realm of privacy, a growing
number of U.S. businesses are being encouraged to back such initiatives. A report by the
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation illustrates this point:
“As momentum grows in the State legislatures and agencies across America to regulate
privacy, some companies that previously opposed Federal legislation . . . now support a
uniform standard that clearly preempts these various, inconsistent State laws.”145
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Although these State privacy laws may be inconsistent in nature, each industry is
adopting similar privacy standards that may eventually coalesce to establish an
overarching regime. Even if an overarching regime does not materialize, there may be
enough uniformity in privacy standards within each industry that closely resembles
comprehensiveness.

VI. GLOBAL TREND TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE PRIVACY REGIME

Many nations are adopting comprehensive privacy laws that reflect the principles
of the Directive and Safe Harbor. For instance, Hong Kong introduced the Personal Data
Privacy Ordinance (“Ordinance”) on January 30, 2001.146 The Ordinance regulates
telecommunication services in direct marketing situations.147 Overlooking the
Ordinance, the Hong Kong Productivity Council (under the authority of a Privacy
Commissioner) refers to specific criteria in determining how personal data should be
transferred from the Council to outside parties.148 Enforcement of privacy violations
provides ‘data subjects’ with rights to correct inaccurate personal data.149 Such rights
bear a striking resemblance to the Principle of “Access” in that it provides consumers
with an opportunity to access and correct any relevant personal data that could be
misused by outside parties. Like the Directive and to some extent the Safe Harbor, the
Ordinance involves tight government controls on the transfer of personal data.
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In 2000, Canada introduced the Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act (PIPEDA).150 PIPEDA involves a three-stage implementation process:
(1) on January 1, 2001, personal data of clients and employees are protected in federally
regulated private industries such as airlines, broadcasting, and banking; (2) on January 1,
2002, personal health data is protected; and (3) on January 1, 2004, PIPEDA standards
will be binding on all Canadian provinces that “collect, uses or discloses” personal data
in the course of commercial activities, whether or not the organization is federally
regulated or not.151 The first stage imposes PIPEDA standards on organizations that
disclose personal data of Canadian citizens outside the country.152 The federal
government may exempt organizations from this implementation process if the
commercial activity is within a province that adopts privacy legislation similar to that of
the federal initiative.153

VII. CONCLUSION

Comprehensiveness is defined as a broad scheme that enforces strict “adequate”
standards for personal data handled by all industries under an overarching regime. Since
the Directive’s adoption, five factors are shaping U.S. privacy laws to become more
comprehensive in nature. First, the Directive is influencing U.S. privacy law in terms of
setting a precedent for enforcing stricter privacy standards. Second, the influence of the
Safe Harbor is such that it acts as a substitute for comprehensiveness in the U.S. privacy
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regime. With widespread differences in privacy laws between the U.S. and the EU, the
Safe Harbor serves as a useful intermediate link because it merges EU comprehensive
privacy standards with U.S. sectoral standards.
The third and fourth factors, respectively, relate to Congress’s growing concern
over personal data protection, and States’ increasing recognition that similar protections
should be afforded to its own residents. Specifically, Americans are growing wary of
personal data protection from online providers. Such concerns are prompting Congress to
adopt more comprehensive privacy legislation. Fifth, concern over billions of dollars
worth of trade between the EU and the U.S. is forcing the U.S. to consider more
comprehensiveness in streamlining commerce between the two entities.
Over time, these five factors will gather momentum in helping shape a
comprehensive regime within a system traditionally accustomed to a sectoral approach.
Even if the EU version of comprehensiveness does not materialize in the U.S., it can be
argued that various industries in the U.S. are adopting privacy standards so similar to EU
standards that some form of comprehensiveness is being incorporated into a sectoralbased regime. Nonetheless, with respect to U.S. privacy law, this type of regime acts as a
benchmark from which interested parties and relevant authorities may curb misuse of
online personal data. The advantage of a comprehensive privacy regime is that it ensures
uniformity and certainty in protecting personal data for online commerce.
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